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YOUTH RESISTANT TO GANG 
RECRUITMENT AS A PARTICULAR SOCIAL 
GROUP IN LARIOS v. HOLDER 
James Racine* 
Abstract: Central American youth who refuse to join gangs are often sub-
jected to horrific acts of retaliatory violence. Yet, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ introduction of two new requirements for asylum eligibility— visi-
bility and particularity—have quashed the asylum hopes for members of 
this group. Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the visibility 
and particularity requirements and, in Larios v. Holder, applied them to 
deny asylum to youth resistant to gang recruitment. This Comment exam-
ines the development of these requirements and argues that there is no le-
gal basis for their application. It further argues that the requirements un-
reasonably heighten the traditional asylum standard and ultimately 
concludes that the First Circuit should have rejected visibility and particu-
larity as requirements for asylum, thereby rendering youth resistant to gang 
recruitment eligible for asylum. 
Introduction 
 Gangs are a serious threat to Central American communities, and 
especially to young people who refuse to join gangs.1 Courts, however, 
have been extremely reluctant to grant asylum to this group, possibly 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See Laura Pedraza Fariña et al., No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandes-
tine Violence in El Salvador 72 (2010); Michele A. Voss, Note, Young and Marked for Death: 
Expanding the Definition of “Particular Social Group” in Asylum Law to Include Youth Victims of 
Gang Persecution, 37 Rutgers L.J. 235, 239 (2005). Other groups seeking gang-related asylum 
include former gang members and women fearing gang violence, especially sexual violence, 
but this Comment is limited to youth resistant to gang recruitment. See Matthew J. Lister, 
Gang-Related Asylum Claims: An Overview and Prescription, 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 827, 830 (2008) 
(outlining the most typical gang-related asylum claims). The other groups raise a number of 
issues outside the scope of this discussion, including bars to asylum that might include for-
mer gang members’ past criminal activities. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (2006); Sebastian Amar 
et al., CAiR Coal., Seeking Asylum from Gang-Based Violence in Central America: A Resource Manual, 
U.S. Comm. for Refugees & Immigrants, 8–20 (Aug. 2007), http://www.refugees.org/ 
uploadedFiles/Participate/National_Center/Resource_Library/Revised_Gang%20_Resource_ 
Manual_Aug07.pdf (providing information on asylum claims involving former gang mem-
bers). 
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fearing they might open the floodgates to all Central American youth.2 
In Larios v. Holder, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recently joined the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and other U.S. circuit courts in 
denying asylum to youth resistant to gang recruitment.3 These courts 
have created a new tool of exclusion by adding to the basic asylum stan-
dard two difficult-to-meet requirements—visibility and particularity.4 
 Part I of this Comment provides an introduction to the gang phe-
nomenon in Central America, with a focus on the practice of recruit-
ment. Part II traces the history of asylum law and the development of 
the new asylum requirements through case law. This Part shows that 
visibility and particularity were first introduced as factors but were later 
imposed as requirements. It also shows that visibility has been defined 
inconsistently, with two very different definitions. Parts III and IV scru-
tinize the Larios court’s and other courts’ application of these require-
ments to gang-related asylum applications. Part V argues that the First 
Circuit in Larios should have refused to apply visibility and particularity 
as requirements because they are inconsistent with both international 
law and U.S. case law and are an unreasonable addition to the tradi-
tional asylum standard. This Comment ultimately concludes that the 
First Circuit should have remanded the case with instructions to apply 
the traditional test, thereby rendering youth resistant to gang recruit-
ment eligible for asylum. 
I. Central American Gangs and the Danger They Pose to Youth 
 By all accounts, gang violence has taken a considerable toll on 
Central American countries.5 Young people, like the asylum applicant 
                                                                                                                      
 
2 See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594–95 (B.I.A. 2008); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
579, 585–86 (B.I.A. 2008); Elyse Wilkinson, Comment, Examining the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals’ Social Visibility Requirement for Victims of Gang Violence Seeking Asylum, 62 Me. L. Rev. 387, 
413 (2010) (describing the pressure immigration courts face in balancing the needs of asylum 
applicants against the demands of politicians to limit the influx of immigrants). Due to in-
creasing violence, gang-related asylum applications rose dramatically over the last decade. See 
Lister, supra note 1, at 828; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs, U.S. Department of Just., 1 (Mar. 31, 2010), http:// 
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/resources/UNHCR_%20Guidelines_Gang_Related_ 
Asylum.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Gang Guidance Note]. 
3 See Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2010); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 
F.3d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 2009); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 590. 
4 See E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594; S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 583. 
5 See Freddy Funes, Note, Removal of Central American Gang Members: How Immigration 
Laws Fail to Reflect Global Reality, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 301, 316 (2008) (describing the im-
pact of crime on investment and economic development in Central American countries); 
Hal Brands, Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the State, 
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in Larios, are especially vulnerable; most gang members are between 
twelve and twenty-four years old.6 Poor urban youth, in particular, are 
ripe for recruitment and live in communities pervaded by gang vio-
lence.7 
 There are many gangs in Central America, but the two largest are 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (18th Street).8 At the local 
level, gangs engage in small-scale crimes such as robbery and drug traf-
ficking.9 The MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, now international criminal 
networks after years of rapid growth and expansion, are also involved in 
arms smuggling, human trafficking, and other large-scale organized 
crimes.10 MS-13 and 18th Street are notorious for the brutality they 
unleash.11 To consolidate power in neighborhoods, gangs commit es-
pecially ghastly acts of violence, even against non-gang members, “to 
shock the population of a certain area into submission.”12 
 Their size and increasingly “sophisticated” organizational structure 
has enabled these gangs to gain considerable power and influence.13 
Thus, recruitment of new members is critical to maintaining and in-
                                                                                                                      
Strategic Stud. Inst., 34–35 (May 2010), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army. 
mil/pdffiles/PUB986.pdf (describing the psychological effects of gang violence and con-
sequent political destabilization); USAID Bureau for Latin Am. & Caribbean Affairs, Cen-
tral America and Mexico Gang Assessment, USAID, 47, 68, 94, 113, 126 (Apr. 2006), http:// 
www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/gangs_assessment.pdf; Jessica M. 
Vaughan & Jon D. Feere, Taking Back the Streets: ICE and Local Law Enforcement Target Immi-
grant Gangs, Center for Immigr. Stud., 3 (Oct. 2008), http://www.cis.org/articles/2008/ 
back1208.pdf (describing the extremely high murder rate in Central American countries 
compared to the murder rate in the United States). 
6 Brands, supra note 5, at 25; see Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 106 (1st Cir. 2010). 
7 Brands, supra note 5, at 25; USAID Bureau for Latin Am. & Caribbean Affairs, supra 
note 5, at 17. 
8 Fact Sheet: Gangs in Guatemala, Guat. Hum. Rts. Comm’n/USA, 1, http://www. 
ghrc-usa.org/Publications/GangFactSheet.pdf (last visited May 8, 2011). Of the estimated 
8000 to 14,000 gang members in Guatemala, 18th Street comprises about fifteen percent 
and MS-13 about eighty percent. Id. The origins of MS-13 can be traced to the 1980s, when 
thousands of youth fled civil conflicts and immigrated to the United States, where they 
formed their own gangs to protect themselves from American gangs. See Central American 
Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource Guide, Wash. Office on Latin Am., 2 (May 2008), 
http://www.wola.org/media/Gangs/WOLA_Gang_Asylum_Guide.pdf. When deportation 
increased in the 1990s, many of these immigrants were sent back to their home countries, 
where they continued to organize and recruit new people into their gangs. See id. 
9 See Brands, supra note 5, at 26. 
10 See id. 
11 See, e.g., Honduras Police Find Severed Head, BBC News (Apr. 9, 2004, 12:17 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3613943.stm (describing a particularly gruesome 
act of violence believed to be committed by either MS-13 or 18th Street). 
12 Brands, supra note 5, at 27. 
13 See Fariña et al., supra note 1, at 68–71. 
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creasing power.14 MS-13, for example, is constantly recruiting new 
members.15 Although recruitment sometimes involves offering gifts 
and other enticements, some gangs “rely heavily on forced recruitment 
to expand and maintain their membership.”16 Those who resist re-
cruitment are often subjected to constant harassment and physical 
abuse and may even be murdered.17 
21 
                                                                                                                     
 Partly due to sensationalistic accounts of gang violence by the me-
dia, Central American countries have increasingly adopted heavy-
handed, or mano dura, policies to stem gang violence.18 Such tactics 
include involving the military in combating gangs and allowing police 
to arrest young people who only look the part of gang members.19 
These policies, however, have been a failure.20 They have not reduced 
the level of violence, and gangs continue to recruit new members.
II. History of Asylum Law and the Definition of a  
Particular Social Group 
 An asylum seeker must satisfy the definition of “refugee” laid out 
in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).22 The INA provides the 
following definition for a refugee: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s na-
tionality . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is un-
able or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection 
 
14 See id. at 72–73. In contrast to other gangs in the 1960s, 18th Street did not discrimi-
nate against mixed-race youth, and in 1996 the Los Angeles Times reported that “the gang 
was breaking with tradition by opening recruitment to all youth in a deliberate move to 
increase its membership.” Immigration & Refugee Bd. of Can., El Salvador: Activities of the 
18th Street/Dieciocho Gang; Gang Recruitment; Treatment of People Who Refuse to Join the Gang, 
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (Nov. 22, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/do- 
cid/3f7d4e1c15.html. 
15 Vaughan & Feere, supra note 5, at 10; Jonah M. Temple, Comment, The Merry-Go-
Round of Youth Gangs: The Failure of the U.S. Immigration Removal Policy and the False Outsourc-
ing of Crime, 31 B.C. Third World L.J. 193, 198 (2011). 
16 UNHCR Gang Guidance Note, supra note 2, at 2. 
17 See Fariña et al., supra note 1, at 88–92; Voss, supra note 1, at 239 (describing the 
forms of retaliation used against resisters to gang recruitment); Julia Preston, On Gangs, 
Asylum Law Offers Little, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2010, at A16 (reporting story about young 
man who refused to join gang, was denied asylum in the United States, and was shot in the 
face by gang upon returning to El Salvador). 
18 See Central American Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource Guide, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. 
21 Id. 
22 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
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of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .23 
 The INA’s definition of refugee is derived from the 1967 U.N. Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.24 The purpose of asylum, re-
flected in this definition, is to provide protection to people fearing or 
fleeing from persecution in their home countries.25 The INA thus allows 
the government to grant legal status to victims of persecution or those 
fearing persecution on account of one of the protected grounds.26 
 Asylum applicants who do not fit neatly into one of the more defi-
nite categories—political opinion, religion, race, nationality—can apply 
on the basis of membership in a “particular social group” (PSG).27 The 
term is intentionally flexible and is meant to be “read in an evolution-
ary manner, open to the diverse and changing nature of groups in vari-
ous societies and evolving international human rights norms.”28 Thus, 
youth resistant to gang recruitment have often applied for asylum on 
the basis of membership in a PSG.29 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. The asylum applicant has the burden to prove that he or she is a refugee. Id. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B). 
24 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267; Brief of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 6–8, Granados Gaitan v. Holder, No. 10-1724 (8th Cir. July 13, 2010) 
[hereinafter UNHCR Brief], available at http://www.immigrantlawcentermn.org/documents/ 
litigationseg/8CA_10_1724_Granados-Gaitan_v_Holder_amicus_UNHCR.pdf. By eliminat-
ing geographical and temporal restrictions on the definition of a refugee, the Protocol ex-
panded the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See UNHCR Brief, 
supra, at 6. 
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
26 See id. 
27 See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986); Guidelines on Interna-
tional Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of 
the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. High 
Comm’r for Refugees, ¶ 1 (May 7, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.pdf [herein-
after UNHCR Guidelines]. Groups that have been recognized as PSGs include families, 
tribes, occupational groups, and homosexuals. UNHCR Guidelines, supra, ¶ 1. 
28 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 27, ¶ 3. Although the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees explains that there is no “closed list” of eligible PSGs, a PSG “cannot be inter-
preted as a ‘catch all’ that applies to all persons fearing persecution.” Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
29 See Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 389. Gang-related asylum claims based on religion 
and political opinion have also been filed with little success. See, e.g., In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 591, 597 (B.I.A. 2008); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 588–89 (B.I.A. 2008); see also 
Central American Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource Guide, supra note 8, at 3–4 (listing unpub-
lished gang-related asylum cases featuring claims based on political opinion and religion). 
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 The INA did not define a PSG, and courts have interpreted the 
term in different ways.30 In 1985, the BIA in In re Acosta provided the 
seminal definition.31 According to Acosta, the other grounds for asylum 
in the INA feature “a characteristic that either is beyond the power of 
an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or 
conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.”32 Applying 
the doctrine of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”), the BIA determined 
that members of a PSG must also share a common, immutable charac-
teristic.33 
 This requirement that members of a PSG must share a common, 
immutable characteristic that they cannot change or should not be re-
quired to change has proven to be very influential; indeed, it has been 
adopted by all circuit courts of appeals.34 The test has also received in-
ternational recognition; the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) has adopted it, as have several other countries.35 
 Recently, however, the BIA added two additional requirements to 
the Acosta framework—visibility and particularity.36 Visibility and par-
ticularity were first introduced by the BIA in In re C-A- and In re A-M-
E.37 Although the BIA affirmed the basic principles announced in 
Acosta, it explained that the Acosta standard needed elaboration.38 To 
                                                                                                                      
30 See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1091–93 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled by 
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit initially required a 
“voluntary associational relationship” between a group’s members but now applies that test 
as an alternative to the test articulated in Acosta. See id. at 1092–93. 
31 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985). 
32 Id. at 233. 
33 See id. 
34 See Davlia-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628 (8th Cir. 2008); Koudriachova v. Gon-
zales, 490 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 
1196 (11th Cir. 2006); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2005); Lopez-
Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2004); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 
546 (6th Cir. 2003); Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 2002); Her-
nandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1091–93; Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1998); 
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239–40 (3d Cir. 1993); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 
626 (1st Cir. 1985). 
35 Benjamin Casper et al., The Evolution Convolution of Particular Social Group Law: From 
the Clarity of Acosta to the Confusion of S-E-G-, in Immigration Practice Pointers 565, 566 
(Gregory P. Adams et al. eds., 2010); see UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 27, ¶ 11; see also 
Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 410 (explaining Canada’s Acosta-informed standard). 
36 See Stephen H. Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodríguez, Immigration and Refugee 
Law and Policy 935–36 (5th ed. 2009); see also In re A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73–74 
(B.I.A. 2007); In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006). 
37 See Casper et al., supra note 35, at 566; see also A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73–74; C-A-, 
23 I. & N. Dec. at 959. 
38 See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956. The BIA said in C-A-, “[W]e continue to adhere to 
the Acosta formulation,” but it also referred to Acosta as “the starting point.” Id. at 955–56. 
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that end, the BIA recognized as an important factor in a PSG analysis 
the social “visibility” of the proposed group, or “the extent to which 
members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question 
as members of a social group.”39 The BIA recognized as another impor-
tant factor the “particularity” of the proposed group—that is, a PSG 
must not include terms that “are too amorphous to provide an ade-
quate benchmark for determining group membership.”40 
 Notwithstanding its desire to add to the Acosta standard, in C-A- and 
A-M-E the BIA merely considered visibility and particularity to be factors 
in determining a PSG, not requirements.41 It was not until two BIA cases 
in 2008, In re S-E-G- and In re E-A-G-, that visibility and particularity were 
imposed as requirements to be applied in addition to Acosta’s fundamen- 
tal, immutable characteristic test.42 In S-E-G- and E-A-G-, the BIA again 
affirmed Acosta’s basic principles, adding that visibility and particularity 
merely give “greater specificity” to and provide “clarification” of the 
Acosta standard.43 Yet the BIA in S-E-G- declared that membership in a 
PSG requires that the group be socially visible and sufficiently par-
ticular.44 In neither case did the BIA explain why it converted visibility 
and particularity from factors to requirements.45 
                                                                                                                      
The BIA in A-M-E claimed that it had the obligation to “expand upon” Acosta. 24 I. & N. 
Dec. at 73–74. 
39 See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 951, 957. 
40 See A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76. Assessing “affluent Guatemalans” for particularity, 
the BIA in A-M-E found that the terms “wealthy” and “affluent” are too amorphous to pro-
vide an adequate benchmark for determining group membership because, in a generally 
impoverished country, the “wealthy” could include small business owners and other mid-
dle class people, comprising as little as one percent to as much as twenty percent of the 
population. Id. at 73, 76. 
41 See Casper et al., supra note 37, at 566; see also A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73; C-A-, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. at 957. 
42 See Casper et al., supra note 37, at 566–67; see also E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594; 
S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586. Although E-A-G- did not explicitly refer to visibility and par-
ticularity as requirements, it disqualified the proposed group because it was neither visible 
nor particular. See 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594. 
43 E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594; S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582. 
44 S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582. 
45 Brief Amici Curiarum of the Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinical Program et al. 
at 10, In re Gatimi, Nos. A96-495-092, A96-495-093, A96-495-094 (B.I.A. March 25, 2010) 
[hereinafter Gatimi Brief], available at http://www.immigrantlawcentermn.org/documents/ 
Harvard_Amicus_Brf_BIA_Gatimi.pdf; see E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594; S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. at 582. 
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 Since the BIA introduced visibility, the concept has been applied 
inconsistently, with two different definitions.46 The first definition re-
quires that members of the proposed group be visible, in a literal and 
objective sense, as members of that group to observers.47 The second 
definition requires that society in general (in the applicant’s country of 
origin) merely perceive the proposed group as a group.48 Confusion as 
to the definition of visibility can be traced back to C-A-, which seemed 
to apply the first, objective definition.49 In that case, the BIA defined 
visibility as the possession of characteristics “that were highly visible and 
recognizable by others in the country in question.”50 The BIA then de-
nied that confidential informants were a PSG because “the very nature 
of the conduct at issue is such that it is generally out of the public 
view.”51 A-M-E, in contrast, gravitated toward the second, subjective 
definition and focused on whether Guatemalan society in general per-
ceived “affluent Guatemalans” as a group.52 
 Inconsistency in defining visibility continued in S-E-G- and E-A-G-.53 
In S-E-G-, the BIA cited C-A- for the proposition that the shared charac-
teristics of the proposed group must be “recognizable and discrete,” 
but it seemed to apply the subjective (societal perception) definition of 
visibility in reaching its conclusion.54 In E-A-G-, the BIA’s decision al-
luded to both definitions—it explained that the applicant did not pos-
sess “any characteristics that would cause others in [the applicant’s] 
society to recognize him” as a member of his proposed PSG and also 
                                                                                                                      
46 See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Often it is unclear 
whether the Board is using the term ‘social visibility’ in the literal sense or in the ‘external 
criterion’ sense, or even whether it understands the difference.”). 
47 See Brief for Respondent at 53–54, Granados Gaitan v. Holder, No. 10-1724 (8th Cir. 
Sep. 7, 2010), available at http://www.immigrantlawcentermn.org/documents/litigation 
seg/CA8_10-1724_Gaitan_v_Holder_brf_OIL.pdf. 
48 See id. at 54–55. In its brief in Granados Gaitan v. Holder, the Office of Immigration 
Litigation of the U.S. Department of Justice distinguished between the two definitions and 
argued that the second is the true definition; it seemed to ignore, however, case law in 
which the first definition was applied. See id. at 55. 
49 See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73–75. In denying the asylum claim, the BIA pointed to the 
fact that country reports do not suggest that the proposed group experiences more vio-
lence or human rights violations than other segments of society, which would create the 
general social perception that the group is distinct. See id. at 74–75. 
53 See E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 595; S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582. 
54 See S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586–88 (holding that the applicant failed to show his 
proposed group was viewed as a group by society in general due to a lack of evidence show-
ing the proposed group is especially victimized in a violence-ridden country). 
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observed that the applicant failed to show that his proposed group 
“[was] seen as a segment of the population in any meaningful re-
spect.”55 As S-E-G- and E-A-G- demonstrate, this definitional confusion is 
especially acute in the application of the requirements to gang-related 
asylum applications.56 
III. Visibility and Particularity as Applied by the BIA and the 
First Circuit to Gang-Related Asylum Applications 
 The imposition of visibility and particularity as requirements frus-
trates the asylum claims of youth resistant to gang recruitment.57 Along 
with establishing visibility and particularity as requirements rather than 
factors, S-E-G- and E-A-G- are also significant because they mark the first 
time the BIA addressed resistance to gang recruitment as the basis for 
an asylum claim.58 In S-E-G-, the applicant’s brothers refused to join MS-
13 and, in retaliation, the gang stole money, harassed, beat, and threat-
ened to kill the applicant and her brothers.59 These were not idle 
threats—the applicant and her brothers testified that a young boy in 
the neighborhood was killed for refusing to join the gang.60 In E-A-G-, 
the applicant, a Honduran teenager, had two brothers who were MS-13 
gang members; both were killed by rival gangs before they turned 
twenty.61 Consequently, when members of MS-13 attempted to recruit 
him, he refused to join.62 The applicant in S-E-G- articulated her pro-
posed PSG as “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruit-
ment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership,” 
or “family members of such Salvadoran youth”; the applicant in E-A-G- 
asked the court to recognize as a PSG “persons resistant to gang mem-
bership (refusing to join when recruited).”63 
                                                                                                                      
55 E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594–95. 
56 See infra Part V. 
57 See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2008); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
579, 590 (B.I.A. 2008). 
58 See S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584. The BIA noted, “We have not previously addressed 
whether . . . Salvadoran youths who have resisted gang recruitment . . . constitutes a ‘par-
ticular social group’” and that no federal circuit court had yet issued a decision on the 
matter. See id. at 582. 
59 Id. at 580. 
60 Id. 
61 E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 592. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 593; S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 581. 
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 In both cases, the BIA denied the applicants’ asylum petitions on 
the grounds that the proposed groups did not qualify as PSGs.64 The 
applicants failed to show that youth resistant to gang recruitment pos-
sess characteristics that make them visible or that such groups are per-
ceived as cohesive social groups by Honduran or El Salvadoran society.65 
The BIA reasoned in E-A-G-, “There is no showing that membership in a 
larger body of persons resistant to gangs is of concern to anyone in 
Honduras, including the gangs themselves, or that individuals who are 
part of that body of persons are seen as a segment of the population in 
any meaningful respect.”66 
 The groups also failed the particularity test because, according to 
the BIA in S-E-G-, youth resistant to gang recruitment “make up a po-
tentially large and diffuse segment of society.”67 Responding to the ap-
plicant’s attempt to limit the group to “male children who lack stable 
families and meaningful adult protection, who are from middle and 
low income classes, who live in the territories controlled by the MS-13 
gang,” the BIA explained that each of these characteristics “remain[ed] 
amorphous” and was too open to interpretation.68 
 Although the BIA’s holdings in S-E-G- and E-A-G- have been chal-
lenged, many circuit courts have accepted visibility and particularity, 
sometimes as factors and sometimes as requirements.69 For example, in 
                                                                                                                      
 
64 See E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594; S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 590. 
65 See E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594; S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 588. 
66 E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594–95. 
67 S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 585. The BIA concluded that youth resistant to gang re-
cruitment is too broad to qualify as a PSG because “‘[t]here is no unifying relationship or 
characteristic to narrow this diverse and disconnected group.’” Id. at 586 (quoting Ochoa 
v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
68 Id. at 584–85. 
69 See, e.g., Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956, 958 (4th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing that “adolescents in El Salvador who refuse[d] to join the gangs of that country be-
cause of their opposition to the gangs’ violent and criminal activities” does not constitute a 
PSG); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “young 
Honduran men who have been recruited by the MS-13, but who refuse to join” does not 
constitute a PSG); Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 295 F. App’x 324, 326 (11th Cir. 
2008) (holding that “Honduran schoolboys who conscientiously refuse[d] to join gangs” 
does not constitute a PSG). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is the only circuit court 
that has explicitly rejected visibility and particularity as requirements. See Benitez Ramos v. 
Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir. 2009); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 
2009). Benitez Ramos v. Holder, however, dealt with former gang members rather than youth 
resistant to gang recruitment, and Judge Posner in Gatimi v. Holder said he had “no quar-
rel” with holding that youth resistant to gang recruitment are not a PSG. See Benitez Ramos, 
589 F.3d at 428; Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616. Despite the circuit split, the U.S. Supreme Court 
recently denied certiorari to a case challenging the BIA’s holdings. See Contreras-Martinez, 
346 F. App’x at 958, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3274 (2010). Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont 
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Scatambuli v. Holder, the First Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly de-
scribed visibility and particularity as “factors” that are merely “relevant” 
to the PSG analysis.70 Addressing visibility and particularity for the first 
time, the First Circuit held that informants who feared retaliation were 
not a PSG.71 The court upheld C-A- and A-M-E and noted that the BIA 
had refined its definition of PSG.72 The court in Scatambuli also applied 
the objective definition of visibility, stating that a PSG is socially visible if 
its members possess “‘characteristics . . . visible and recognizable by oth-
ers in the [native] country.’”73 
 Conversely, in 2009, the First Circuit established in Faye v. Holder 
that visibility and particularity are requirements for PSG.74 Faye also de-
fined visibility according to the subjective definition, requiring that a 
PSG be perceived as a group by society in general.75 The First Circuit 
adhered to an understanding of visibility and particularity as require-
ments when, in 2010, it addressed gang-related asylum applications for 
the first time.76 In Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, the First Circuit accepted 
S-E-G-’s analysis, applying visibility and particularity as requirements to 
deny asylum to “young women recruited by gang members who resist 
such recruitment.”77 Shortly after Mendez-Barrera, the First Circuit again 
upheld S-E-G- and denied asylum to youth resistant to gang recruit-
ment.78 
IV. Larios v. Holder 
 In July 2005, a fourteen-year-old Guatemalan native, Maynor 
Alonso Larios, fled to the United States.79 Later that year, the United 
States initiated removal proceedings against him for being present in 
                                                                                                                      
also introduced the Refugee Protection Act of 2010, which would amend the definition of 
refugee by codifying the Acosta standard and declaring that there are no other require-
ments, such as visibility or particularity, to establish a PSG. S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5(a) 
(2010). 
70 Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009). 
71 See id. at 55–56, 59. 
72 Id. at 59. 
73 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006)). 
74 See Faye v. Holder, 580 F.3d 37, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that “women who had 
a child out of wedlock/are considered adulterers because they gave birth to a child alleg-
edly not their husband’s/have been abused by their husbands” is not a PSG because it is 
not a socially visible or sufficiently particular group). 
75 Id. at 41–42. 
76 Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2010). 
77 Id. at 24, 26. 
78 Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2010). 
79 Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 106 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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the country without admission or parole.80 Larios conceded removabil-
ity but applied for asylum, claiming he faced persecution as a member 
of a group of “young Guatemalan men recruited by gang members who 
resist such recruitment.”81 The immigration judge (IJ) denied his appli-
cation for asylum, determining that Larios “failed to establish that he 
faced future persecution on account of a protected ground,” and or-
dered his removal to Guatemala.82 On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
decision and Larios appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.83 
 In Larios, the First Circuit affirmed both the IJ’s and BIA’s deci-
sions to deny Larios’s application for asylum.84 Declaring S-E-G- and 
E-A-G- to be “controlling BIA case law” and bowing to its precedent in 
Mendez-Barrera, the First Circuit concluded that “youth resistant to gang 
recruitment” was not a PSG because it did not meet the requirements 
of visibility and particularity.85 
 In refusing to find a PSG because of a lack of visibility, the First 
Circuit failed to bring clarity to the concept and applied both defini-
tions of visibility.86 With respect to objective visibility, the court found 
no evidence that youth resistant to gang recruitment possessed any 
“characteristics that render members of the putative group socially visi-
ble.”87 In terms of the group’s subjective visibility, the court declared 
that it was not “generally recognized in the community as a cohesive 
group.”88 
 Nor did the First Circuit find the group to be sufficiently particu-
lar.89 The court reasoned, 
[I]t is virtually impossible to identify who is or is not a mem-
ber. There are, for example, questions about who may be con-
sidered “young,” the type of conduct that may be considered 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id. at 106–07. 
81 Id. at 107, 108. 
82 Id. at 107. 
83 Id. at 106. On appeal, Larios argued two other points—that the BIA’s procedure of 
upholding an IJ’s decision without issuing an opinion is unconstitutional and that the 
BIA’s failure to address his second proposed social group, “street children,” also violated 
his due process rights. Id. at 108. The First Circuit rejected both arguments, reasoning that 
the issuance without opinion procedure is “a valid exercise of the Attorney General’s dis-
cretion to fashion its own rules of procedure” and that the BIA was not obligated to con-
sider the “street children” group because Larios failed to raise it before the IJ. Id. 




88 See id. 
89 Larios, 608 F.3d at 109. 
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“recruit[ment],” and the degree to which a person must dis-
play “resist[ance].” These are ambiguous group characteris-
tics, largely subjective, that fail to establish a sufficient level of 
particularity.90 
Summing up its holding, the First Circuit concluded that “because 
[the] putative social group is neither socially visible nor sufficiently par-
ticular . . . the IJ did not err in denying Larios’s claim for asylum based 
on Larios’s membership in this particular group.”91 
V. Criticisms of Visibility and Particularity 
 As Larios demonstrates, a major barrier to the asylum hopes of 
youth resistant to gang recruitment is the application of social visibility 
and particularity as requirements for establishing a PSG.92 As immigrant 
advocates, the United Nations, and Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals have cogently argued, the heighted standard that S-E-G- 
and E-A-G- introduced contradicts international law, is inconsistent with 
the traditional Acosta standard and U.S. case law decided under it, and 
only confuses the PSG analysis with detrimental consequences for de-
serving applicants.93 Thus, the First Circuit Court of Appeals should not 
have deferred to the BIA’s decisions in S-E-G- and E-A-G.94 
 First, visibility and particularity do not comport with international 
law.95 The UNHCR has criticized the requirements for not being “in 
accordance with the text, context or object and purpose of the 1951 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, nor with the [UNHCR’s] Social Group 
Guidelines.”96 Although the BIA professed to have international support 
for imposing visibility and particularity as requirements, it misinter-
preted the UNHCR guidelines on which it based its claim.97 The guide-
lines clearly state that visibility is an alternative to the fundamental, 
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st 
Cir. 2010)). 
91 Id. 
92 See Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2010). 
93 Casper et al., supra note 35, at 567–69; see Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 413–15. 
94 Casper et al., supra note 35, at 567–69; see Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 413–15. 
95 See UNHCR Brief, supra note 24, at 9–18; see also Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 413–14. 
96 UNHCR Brief, supra note 24, at 4. The UNHCR submitted its amicus brief pursuant 
to its mandate of supervising the application of international conventions for the protec-
tion of refugees. See id. at 1. 
97 Id. at 15; see In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 586 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[T]he 2002 guide-
lines of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees . . . endorse[d] an approach 
in which an important factor is whether the members of the group are ‘perceived as a 
group by society.’”); UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 27, ¶ 11. 
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immutable characteristic test from Acosta, not a clarification, elabora-
tion, or addition to it.98 The visibility test, therefore, should only be im-
posed if the applicant fails the Acosta test.99 The requirement of par-
ticularity is inconsistent with international law because the apparent 
purpose of such a requirement is to limit the number of people eligible 
for asylum.100 This approach contradicts the UNHCR’s guidelines, 
which assert that “the fact that large numbers of persons risk persecu-
tion cannot be a ground for refusing to extend international protection 
where it is otherwise appropriate.”101 
 The addition of visibility and particularity also does not square 
with Acosta’s interpretive methodology, which determined the defini-
tion of PSG by identifying the general principle underlying the other 
protected groups.102 The other protected categories are not subjected 
to any visibility or particularity limitation.103 For example, a religion can 
be practiced in private and an unorthodox political opinion may not 
make its possessor stand out at all, in an objective sense.104 In terms of 
subjective societal understanding, an applicant’s political opinion or 
religious beliefs need not be generally recognized by society in order 
for the applicant to gain asylum.105 Additionally, the size of the group, 
implicit in the concept of particularity, should not be considered in de-
termining a PSG because a persecuted political opinion, for example, 
could be held by the majority of a population and yet those who hold it 
would still be eligible for asylum.106 
                                                                                                                      
98 See UNHCR Brief, supra note 24, at 13; UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 27, ¶ 11 
(“[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic 
other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society.”). 
99 See UNHCR Brief, supra note 24, at 13; UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 27, ¶ 11. 
100 See UNHCR Brief, supra note 24, at 17. 
101 UNCHR Guidelines, supra note 27, ¶ 18. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently held that all women in Guatemala may constitute a PSG. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 
F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010). The court stated, “[W]e have rejected the notion that a per-
secuted group may simply represent too large a portion of a population to allow its mem-
bers to qualify for asylum,” adding, “the size and breadth of a group alone does not pre-
clude a group from qualifying as [a PSG].” Id. 
102 See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 216 (B.I.A. 1985); Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari at 16, Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-830), 
2010 WL 128010 at *16; supra Part III. 
103 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 16; see INA, 8 USC § 1101(a)(42) 
(2006); Gatimi Brief, supra note 45, at 15. 
104 Gatimi Brief, supra note 45, at 15; see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
102, at 16. 
105 Gatimi Brief, supra note 45, at 15; see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
102, at 16. 
106 See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 27, ¶ 18. 
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 The visibility and particularity requirements are also inconsistent 
with case law decided under the Acosta standard.107 As Judge Posner has 
pointed out, many groups have been recognized as PSGs whose mem-
bers would not be literally visible.108 For example, homosexuals, 
women of a certain tribe who have not yet been subjected to female 
genital mutilation, and former members of the national police have 
been recognized as PSGs.109 Moreover, the BIA in S-E-G- and E-A-G-, al-
though claiming to uphold Acosta and C-A-, actually transformed visibil-
ity and particularity from factors to requirements, without offering justi-
fication.110 
 The visibility and particularity requirements are also unreasonable 
and simply confuse the PSG analysis.111 For example, the visibility con-
cept’s lack of definitional clarity has resulted in the application of two 
very different definitions; the BIA has offered no guidance as to which 
is the true definition or when to apply one over the other.112 One pos-
sible consequence of this confusion is the disqualification of a deserv-
ing group that meets one definition of visibility but not the other.113 
 The requirements also confuse the definition of a PSG with other 
elements of the refugee definition.114 Visibility and particularity, for 
example, are more relevant in showing a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.115 Applying the literal, objective meaning of visibility is 
senseless, as Judge Posner pointed out, because it would require victims 
                                                                                                                      
107 See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009). 
108 See id. 
109 See id. (citing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Fuentes, 19 
I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988)). 
110 Gatimi Brief, supra note 45, at 10; see In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 
2008); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582; supra Part III. 
111 See Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 413, 415. 
112 See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009); supra Part III. 
113 See Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 413 (“[T]he lack of a clear definition combined with 
the heightened burden [of the new requirements] changes the balance almost positively 
in favor of denial of asylum.”). For example, youth resistant to gang recruitment are not 
visible in the literal, objective sense, but general society may well perceive such youth as a 
social group. See UNHCR Brief, supra note 24, at 25–27. Resisting recruitment is a sign of 
disrespect to gangs and puts the resister at great risk of retaliation; thus, resistance makes 
resisters “stand out from the rest of the community” and “set[s] them apart in society.” See 
UNHCR Gang Guidance Note, supra note 2, at 4, 12 (describing the importance of respect 
for gangs and the risks of showing disrespect). There is also a general societal perception 
that young, poor men are prime targets for gang recruitment. See Clare Ribando Seelke, 
Cong. Research Serv., RL 34112, Gangs in Central America 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf; UNHCR Gang Guidance Note, supra note 2, 
at 4. 
114 See Gatimi Brief, supra note 45, at 16–17; Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 415. 
115 See Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430; Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 415. 




ing that youth resistant to gang recruitment do 
not qualify for asylum. 
                                                                                                                     
“who take pains to avoid being socially visible” to instead “pin[] a target 
to their backs.”116
 The traditional Acosta test is internationally accepted and much 
more analytically sound than the test created by the BIA in S-E-G- and 
E-A-G-.117 Thus, the First Circuit Court of Appeals should have joined 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in rejecting visibility and particu-
larity as requirements under PSG analysis.118 Then, the First Circuit 
should have remanded with instructions to apply the traditional Acosta 
test, thereby making asylum available to youth resistant to gang recruit-
ment, a group for whom “hope is largely absent” in their home cou
Conclusion 
 Youth resistant to gang recruitment deserve the protection from 
persecution that asylum offers. Refusing to join a gang places bull’s-eyes 
on the heads of young Central American people, especially those from 
poor backgrounds. Yet the BIA and most circuit courts of appeals have 
adopted a heightened standard for asylum that disqualifies this group. 
This standard—requiring that the proposed group be socially visible 
and sufficiently particular—is inconsistent with international law and 
U.S. case law and unreasonably heightens the traditional standard. 
Thus, the First Circuit Court of Appeals erred in adopting the BIA’s 
requirements and hold
 
116 See Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430. 
117 See Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 413–15. 
118 See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616. 
119 Jeffrey D. Corsetti, Note, Marked for Death: The Maras of Central America and Those 
Who Flee Their Wrath, 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 407, 416 (2006) (describing the “grim picture” 
of reality for young people in Central America resisting gang recruitment); see Kasinga, 21 
I. & N. Dec. at 366. 
